Reso 2008-1361 - Laserfiche WebLink

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CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, Plaintiff, v. JOEL W. ROBBINS, etc., et aI., Defendants. Cir... Page 2 of 3 Palm Hotel, although that agreement recognized Loews' priority access to the first 560 spaces and provided for a lower usage fee and lower share of revenues from garage operations. The Florida Constitution provides that municipal property shall be exempted from taxation only if it owned by a municipality and "used exclusively by it for municipal or public purposes." Article VII, section 4, Florida Constitution. As the Official Commentator to the Constitution explained, "[I]n order to qualify for the constitutional mandatory municipal exemption, property must (1) be owned by a municipality and (2) be used exclusively by the municipality for either municipal or public purposes. . . ." Id., Commentary. Art.VII, section 3, Fla. Const. (West Stat. Ann. 1995). To qualify as a municipal or public purpose the subject property must be used for a "governmental- governmental" purpose and not merely for a "governmental-proprietary" purpose. See, e.g., Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 642 So. 2d 1072, 1073 (I 994). This standard reflects the changes concerning municipal exemptions made by the 1968 Constitution. See, e.g., Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 433 (Fla. 1975). In Williams, the Supreme Court emphasized that the 1968 Constitution required that "all property used by private persons and commercial enterprises is subjected to taxation. . . . . Thus, all privately used property bears a burden in some manner and this is what the Constitution mandates." 326 So. 2d at 433. The private uses of the garage described above clearly do not qualify as serving a governmental-governmental purpose. The City suggested that the term "public purpose" be given the more relaxed meaning that it has in the context of revenue bonds and eminent domain. This argument, however, was rejected by the Supreme Court as recently as 2001 in Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre, 783 So. 2d 238, 250-51, n. 15 & 16 (Fla. 2001). The Court explained that the stricter standard was required because "any newly-created tax exemption necessarily involves a direct shift in tax burden from the exempt property to other non- exempt properties." 783 So. 2d at 250. The City also suggested that the private uses of the garage by the retail stores and the "two Hotels are merely incidental. The Court finds, however, that the lease of 20,000 square feet of retail space, the granting of "priority access" to 560 out of 800 parking spaces, and the inclusion of private companies in sharing profits from the operations of the garage are private, for-profit uses too substantial to qualify as incidental. The City also suggests that the Hotels' uses should be discounted because they are not granted by leases. The Hotels' uses, however, are granted by Easements and Covenants running with the land which do not eliminate the private use of the property and, if anything, convey to the Hotels greater and more secure property interests in the garage than would be conveyed by leases. In deciding this matter, the Court must take into consideration the fact that the Court is reviewing a decision of a Constitutional officer in the area of his discretion. For this reason, the Property Appraiser's determination to grant or deny an exemption is entitled to a presumption of correctness. Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977); Markham v. June Rose, 495 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). The Taxpayer's heavy burden in this case is to exclude every reasonable hypothesis that would support the Property Appraiser's conclusion that the property is not exempt. See, e.g., Straughn, 354 So. 2d at 371. This burden was not altered by the enactment of Section 194.301 of Florida Statutes because the bill creating that section was specifically amended to clarify "that the bill relates to valuations made by the property appraiser and not exemptions or categorizations." Bill Analysis & Economic Impact Statement for HB 445, House Finance & Tax Committee (Fla. March 11, 1997). For the above-stated reasons, the Court upholds the decision of the Property Appraiser to deny a municipal tax exemption to the subject property. Accordingly, the Court grants the Property Appraiser's Request for Judicial Notice, grants the Property Appraiser's Motion for Final Summary Judgment and denies the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Final judgment is hereby entered for the Property hrtp://www.floridalawweekly .com/newsystem/showfile. php?fromsearch= 1 &file=. ./supfil... 11/26/2008